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WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE: THE FUTURE OF
TAX ACCRUAL WORK PAPER DISCOVERY IN
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AFTER TEXTRON
Tracy Hamilton*
INTRODUCTION
The struggle between the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and
business taxpayers regarding the discovery of tax accrual work
papers is not a new battle.1 The IRS, seeking a road map of the
corporation’s vulnerable tax positions, argues that tax accrual work
papers are prepared for ordinary business purposes and are not
subject to the protection of the work product privilege as established
in Hickman v. Taylor and codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3).2 Corporate taxpayers, desperate to keep the IRS from
discovering work papers containing the probability of success
analysis of vulnerable tax positions (not to mention potential
tolerance for settlement), argue that tax accrual work papers are
prepared in anticipation of potential litigation with the IRS, contain

∗ J.D. Candidate, 2011, Georgia State University College of Law.
1. Tax accrual work papers typically consist of a listing of vulnerable tax positions and the
company’s assessment of likelihood of success on each position if the IRS challenges it. See discussion
infra Part I.A. See generally United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (IRS challenge
of a judgment holding that tax work papers are privileged); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d
Cir. 1998) (appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s internal memo regarding tax
consequences of proposed business transaction); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1982) (appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s tax accrual work papers); I.R.S.
Announcement 2002-63 (July 8, 2002) (IRS expands internal policy on seeking tax accrual work
papers).
2. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947) (“[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a
certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper
preparation of a client’s case demands that he . . . prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
undue and needless interference.”); United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I.
2007) (“The IRS asserts that the workpapers were prepared in the ordinary course of business and in
order to satisfy the requirements of the securities laws that financial statements filed by publicly traded
companies comply with GAAP . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“[A] party may not discover documents
and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial . . . .”).

729

Published by Reading Room, 2011

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 7

730

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:3

mental impressions and strategy related to the potential litigation, and
are subject to protection under the work product privilege doctrine.3
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether tax accrual work
papers, created both for financial reporting purposes and to aid in
potential disputes with the IRS, fall under the protection of the work
product privilege as material created “in anticipation of litigation.”4
Circuit courts, faced with the question of whether tax accrual work
papers were created in anticipation of litigation, have developed two
distinct tests for analyzing the material: the “primary motivating
purpose” test and the “because of” litigation test.5 A third test was
added on August 13, 2009, when the First Circuit, in United States v.
Textron Inc., overturned the district court’s application of the because
of litigation test and established a new, narrow “for use” test.6
The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed whether tax accrual work
papers are protected by the work product privilege, nor has it
formally adopted a test for determining whether material meets the in
anticipation of litigation requirement for work product protection.7
3. See Textron, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (“Textron asserts that its tax accrual workpapers were
prepared because it anticipated the possibility of litigation with the IRS regarding various items on its
return and it points to the hazards of litigation percentages as evidence that the possibility of such
litigation was the reason for preparing the workpapers.”).
4. See United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue before us, namely, one in which a document is not in any way prepared ‘for’ litigation
but relates to a subject that might or might not occasion litigation.”); id. at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting)
(“The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to intervene and set the circuits straight on this issue which is
essential to the daily practice of litigators across the country.”); Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No.
2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008) (“The Supreme Court has not
provided a controlling standard, and a split has developed between the various courts of appeal.”).
5. See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (“Litigation need not be imminent . . . as long as the primary
motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation.”
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981))); Adlman, 134
F.3d at 1195 (“We hold that a document created because of anticipated litigation, which tends to reveal
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories concerning the litigation, does not lose workproduct protection merely because it is intended to assist in the making of a business decision . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
6. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 29 (3-2 decision) (“From the outset, the focus of work product
protection has been on materials prepared for use in litigation, whether the litigation was underway or
merely anticipated.” (emphasis added)); id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The majority purports to
follow this [because of litigation] test, but never even cites it. Rather, in its place, the majority imposes a
‘prepared for’ test, asking if the documents were ‘prepared for use in possible litigation.’”).
7. See discussion infra Part II.A; Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *5 (noting that the Eleventh
Circuit had not adopted a test, and it was not necessary to decide which test should be adopted in this
case because the material at issue would be protected under either the because of or primary motivating
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Part I of this Note discusses the various tests adopted for
determining whether material is prepared in anticipation of litigation,
including the recent creation of a new test by the First Circuit Court’s
decision in Textron.8 Part II analyzes the existing primary motivating
purpose and because of tests, the history of the Eleventh Circuit’s
decisions regarding material prepared in anticipation of litigation, and
the potential impact on the Eleventh Circuit of the new for use test
established by the First Circuit in Textron.9 Part III proposes that the
Eleventh Circuit formally adopt the because of litigation test based on
the merits of this test and the weaknesses of the primary motivating
purpose and the new for use tests.10
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Purpose of Tax Accrual Work Papers
The tax accrual work papers of interest to the IRS11—and litigated
in the courts—typically consist of schedules and other material
prepared by the corporation’s lawyers and tax department.12 The
schedules list the tax positions reported on the corporation’s tax
return that could be vulnerable to attack by the IRS.13
Publicly traded corporations are required by law to have their
financial statements audited by independent public accountants to
ensure compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
factor test); see also Michelle M. Henkel, Textron: The Debate Continues as to Whether Auditor
Transparency Waives the Work Product Privilege, 50 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 251, 253 n.22 (2009)
(listing the circuits adopting one of the two main tests and noting that the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
have yet to adopt tests).
8. See discussion infra Part I.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. The term “tax accrual work papers” is a general term used to indicate work papers that analyze
potential tax liabilities that could arise due to a dispute with a taxing authority. These work papers are
also known as “tax pool analysis work papers,” “FIN 48 work papers,” or “tax reserve work papers.”
See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1982) (“This appeal is centrally
concerned with documents known to the accounting profession under various names—the noncurrent
tax account, the tax accrual work papers, and the tax pool analysis.”).
12. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 812–13 (1984); United States v.
Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2009); El Paso, 682 F.2d at 532–34.
13. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 812–13; Textron, 577 F.3d at 23; El Paso, 682 F.2d at 532–34.
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(GAAP).14 As part of this process, GAAP requires that the
corporation have adequate liabilities recorded for uncertain tax
benefits (tax reserves).15 The process requires that the corporation
identify vulnerable tax positions and quantify the ultimate potential
liability.16 First, the entity must determine if it is more likely than not
that a specific tax position will be sustained on examination based on
its technical merits.17 If the position is more likely than not to be
sustained, the entity must measure the position at “the largest
amount . . . greater than 50 percent likely of being realized upon
ultimate settlement with a taxing authority.”18 The resulting tax
reserve is recorded on the entity’s financial statements.19 In essence,
these tax accrual work papers evaluate the likelihood of success in a
dispute with the IRS and calculate the potential liability related to the
specific tax position if disputed.20 The tax accrual work papers serve
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (2006) (outlining registration application procedure with the Securities and
Exchange Commission requiring balance sheets certified by a registered public accounting firm); 15
U.S.C. § 78(m) (2006) (outlining annual reporting requirement of publically registered entities requiring
quarterly and annual reports certified by a registered public accounting firm).
15. See ACCOUNTING FOR UNCERTAINTY IN INCOME TAXES, Interpretation No. 48, ¶ 17 (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 2006) (codified at FASB CODIFICATION § 740-10-25-16 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter FASB Interpretation No. 48] (requiring
establishment of liability for uncertain tax positions). The Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) is the organization that establishes and issues standards governing financial reporting by
nongovernmental entities. Facts about FASB, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD,
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1176154526495. The FASB issues literature that
makes up part of the body of financial accounting guidance known as Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). See Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, FEDERAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD, http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html. This literature includes
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) and Interpretations (FIN). See id. On July 1, 2009,
the FASB released its Accounting Standards Codification (FASB Codification), which was the
culmination of an effort by the FASB to combine and organize the existing GAAP literature. See
Accounting Standards Codification: Notice to Constituents (v 4.1) About the Codification (Apr. 30,
2010), http://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/18/6896518.pdf.
16. See FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 5–8 (discussing recognition and
measurement steps).
17. See id. at ¶ 6 (outlining first step of whether or not to recognize a tax benefit created by a
particular tax position).
18. See id. at ¶ 8 (outlining second step of calculating the amount to reserve related to the recognized
tax position).
19. The tax reserve amount that is established on the company’s financial statements is the
difference between the full benefit of the tax position and the most likely settlement scenario. See id. at
¶ 17.
20. Id.; United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The final spreadsheets list
each debatable item, including in each instance the dollar amount subject to possible dispute and a
percentage estimate of the IRS’ chances of success.”).
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a dual-purpose—they are prepared to comply with current financial
reporting requirements, and they aid in business decisions regarding
whether to litigate a particular issue or possible settlement
scenarios.21 Courts have not agreed on whether dual-purpose material
properly fits under the definition of prepared in anticipation of
litigation.22 The result has been the development of various tests to
analyze material under the in anticipation of litigation requirement of
Rule 26(b)(3).23
B. Work Product Privilege and the in Anticipation of Litigation
Requirement
Hickman v. Taylor is the leading case for the principle of the work
product privilege.24 In Hickman, the Supreme Court held that certain
documents and other tangible things prepared during litigation, when
not protected by another privilege (such as the attorney-client
privilege), are nonetheless protected from discovery by opponents
because they contain the attorney’s thoughts, ideas, and strategy.25
This principle was codified by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3), which sets forth the requirement for protection as “prepared

21. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(l) (2006) (requiring financial statements be certified by a registered public
accounting firm); 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2006) (requiring annual reports certified by independent public
accountants). For discussion by courts of dual-purpose documents, see, for example, United States v.
Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1998); Textron, 577 F.3d at 33 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
22. See Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 (holding that material created because of anticipated litigation
does not lose work product protection simply because it has a dual business purpose). But see Textron,
577 F.3d at 26 (utilizing new for use in litigation test and holding dual-purpose documents not protected
because not prepared for use in possible litigation); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th
Cir. 1982) (utilizing primary motivating purpose test and holding dual-purpose documents not
protected).
23. See discussion infra Part I.B.
24. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); see, e.g., Textron, 577 F.3d at 25 (noting that the work
product privilege is derived from Hickman v. Taylor); United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 593
(6th Cir. 2006) (“The ‘work product privilege’ was first recognized by the Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor . . . .”); EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN & MICHAEL M. MARTIN, AM BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LITIG., THE
ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK–PRODUCT DOCTRINE 100 (1989) (1982) (“Discussion
of the work-product doctrine must begin with the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Hickman v.
Taylor . . . .”).
25. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510–11.
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in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”26 Clearly, work product
containing the attorney’s thoughts and strategy that are prepared for
trial are protected,27 but how far should the work product protection
extend? Should material that contains the attorney’s thoughts, ideas,
and strategies but that is not prepared for trial be discoverable?28
The Supreme Court has not established a test for determining
whether material is prepared in anticipation of litigation.29 Circuit
courts have struggled to apply the prepared in anticipation of
litigation requirement, and various tests have evolved for analyzing
material that is not prepared for trial but nonetheless may be
protected work product.30 The Second Circuit has adopted a because
of litigation test, holding that work product privilege protection
extends to tax accrual work papers which would not be prepared “but
for” the potential for litigation, despite the dual-purpose of the work
papers.31 The Fifth Circuit adopted a more narrow primary
motivating purpose test, holding that tax accrual work papers are not
protected by the work product privilege because the immediate and
primary purpose of the work papers is to comply with relevant
accounting standards, resulting in a clean audit opinion of the
company’s financial statements, despite the use of the work papers in
potential litigation.32 The First Circuit, in its recent decision in United
States v. Textron, Inc., seemed to ignore the adopted because of
litigation test and created a new for use in litigation test, significantly

26. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things
that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
representative . . . .”).
27. Id.
28. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 26 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue before us, namely,
one in which a document is not in any way prepared ‘for’ litigation but relates to a subject that might or
might not occasion litigation.”).
29. See id.; id. at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting); Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008).
30. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (primary motivating purpose
test); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998) (because of litigation test); Textron,
577 F.3d at 26 (new for use in litigation test).
31. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195.
32. See El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542.
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narrowing the scope of protection historically provided to tax accrual
work papers in the First Circuit.33
1. Because of Litigation Test
The Second Circuit first applied the because of litigation test in
United States v. Adlman.34 The court vacated and remanded the
district court’s decision enforcing an IRS summons, the subject of
which was a memorandum evaluating the tax consequences of
possible litigation with the IRS around a proposed corporate
reorganization.35 The court of appeals held that material “created
because of anticipated litigation” that contains the “mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or theories” of the attorney does
not lose protection just because the material has a dual-purpose.36
The court further stated that “[w]here a document was created
because of anticipated litigation, and would not have been prepared
in substantially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation, it
falls within Rule 26(b)(3).”37 This standard allows material, which is
created in anticipation of litigation but happens to have a dualpurpose of assisting in business decisions, protection as work
product.38 The because of litigation test has been widely adopted and
is the most prevalent test utilized by circuit courts to analyze material
under the in anticipation of litigation requirement for work product
privilege.39 This test views the underlying premise of the work
33. See Textron, 577 F.3d at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that while the majority purports to
follow the because of test, it instead applies a new for use test that “is an even narrower variant of the
widely rejected ‘primary motivating purpose’ test . . . specifically repudiated by this court”).
34. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195.
35. Id. at 1197. This was a case of first impression for the Second Circuit. The court performed a
thorough analysis of the possible tests it could use to determine whether a litigation analysis prepared to
assist the company in making a business decision could be protected by the work product doctrine. Id.
36. Id. at 1195.
37. Id.
38. Id. (holding that dual-purpose document containing legal analysis of outcome of potential
litigation was not denied protection simply because it aided in business decision of whether to pursue the
transaction).
39. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *5 (N.D.
Ala. May 8, 2008) (“[T]he court concludes that the Eleventh Circuit would align itself with the majority
of the other courts of appeal and adopt the ‘because of litigation’ test.”). For other courts adopting the
because of test, see Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir.
1992); Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987); Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of
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product privilege as that of protecting the attorney’s mental
impressions and strategy and accepts as a possibility that some
material created in the ordinary course of business will be
protected.40
2. Primary Motivating Purpose Test
The Fifth Circuit articulated the primary motivating purpose test in
United States v. El Paso, Co.41 Here, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s enforcement of an IRS summons for certain tax
accrual work papers and held that the work product privilege
extended to material prepared in anticipation of litigation only when
“the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document
was to aid in possible future litigation.”42 The court interpreted the
advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)
to exclude any material that is assembled in the ordinary course of
business even if that material may have been prepared because of
potential litigation.43 Therefore, under this test, any material that is
prepared in the ordinary course of business or because of public
requirements, despite containing the mental impressions or theories
of attorneys, can be denied work product protection.44 This test is
Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 587 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d
1109, 1118–19 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979).
40. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195 (noting that a business document does not necessarily “lose workproduct protection merely because it is intended to assist in the making of a business decision influenced
by the likely outcome of the anticipated litigation”).
41. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Litigation need not be
imminent . . . as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid
in possible future litigation.” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040
(5th Cir. 1981))).
42. Id. at 542 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981)).
43. Id. (“Excluded from work product materials, as the advisory committee notes to Rule 26(b)(3)
make clear, are ‘materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public
requirements unrelated to litigation . . . .’”). However, the advisory committee’s notes go on to explain
this statement as reiterating the holding in Hickman v. Taylor that relevant facts are always discoverable,
even if those facts are in a document not otherwise discoverable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory
committee’s note (1970), reprinted in Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501 (70) [hereinafter
1970 Amendments].
44. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542–43 (“Even assuming that El Paso’s tax pool analysis otherwise
qualifies for work product protection, we hold the doctrine unavailable here because the tax pool
analysis is not prepared ‘in anticipation of litigation.’”).
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more narrow than the because of litigation test because the primary
motivating purpose test will deny protection to work papers
containing the mental impressions of attorneys with respect to
possible litigation simply because there is a business use.45 The
primary motivating purpose test has been rejected by many courts,46
criticized as being too narrow and inconsistent with the purpose of
the work product privilege, which is to protect the mental
impressions and strategies of attorneys in preparing for potential
litigation.47
3. The For Use in Litigation Test
In 2008, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, applying the because of litigation test adopted by the First
Circuit in Maine v. U.S. Department of the Interior,48 rejected an IRS
summons seeking tax accrual work papers.49 Despite the taxpayer’s
need to create these work papers to obtain a clean audit opinion, the
court held that because these work papers were prepared because of

45. Id.
46. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Framing the inquiry as
whether the primary or exclusive purpose of the document was to assist in litigation threatens to deny
protection to documents that implicate key concerns underlying the work-product doctrine.”); Maine v.
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting the because of test and noting the
rejection of the primary motivating purpose test by the Adlman court); Evergreen Trading, LLC ex rel.
Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 132–33 (2007) (holding that the because of test is preferable
to the primary motivating purpose test because “such an approach could unreasonably deny the
protection to ‘dual-purpose’ documents generated in making the decision whether to enter into a
transaction based upon tax litigation concerns, even though such documents could reveal an attorney’s
litigating strategies and assessment of legal vulnerabilities—precisely the type of discovery that the
Supreme Court refused to permit in Hickman”).
47. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198 (“[A] requirement that documents be produced primarily . . . to assist
in litigation . . . is at odds with the text and the policies of the Rule. Nowhere does Rule 26(b)(3) state
that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to constitute work
product . . . .”); see also Maine, 298 F.3d at 68; Evergreen Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 133.
48. The because of litigation test was adopted by the First Circuit in Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior. 298 F.3d at 68. The First Circuit reversed the district court’s enforcement of a summons related
to work papers and explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s primary motivating purpose test, formally
adopting the because of litigation test and citing the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Adlman. Id.
49. United States v. Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.R.I. 2007).
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anticipated litigation, they were protected work product.50 A panel of
the First Circuit upheld the district court’s decision.51
The First Circuit granted the government’s petition for rehearing
en banc and, on August 13, 2009, in its decision in United States v.
Textron, Inc., vacated and remanded the district court’s finding,
holding that Textron’s work papers were not protected by the work
product privilege.52 The circuit court abandoned the because of test
adopted in Maine and instead created a completely new test for
analyzing the in anticipation of litigation requirement of Rule
26(b)(3).53 The new (and very narrow)54 test—the for use in litigation
test—requires that material be prepared for use in possible litigation,
allowing discovery of documents where there was no implication that
they would actually be used at trial.55 The Textron court’s view that
the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done for
litigation and not for preparing financial statements is evidenced by
the court’s statement: “‘[P]repared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial’ did not . . . mean prepared for some purpose other than
litigation: it meant only that the work might be done for litigation but
in advance of its institution.”56
C. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has not addressed whether tax accrual work
papers may be protected by the work product privilege, nor has it
formally adopted a test for determining whether material meets the in

50. Id. at 150 (“Moreover, even if the workpapers were needed to satisfy E & Y that Textron’s
reserves complied with GAAP, that would not alter the fact that the workpapers were prepared ‘because
of’ anticipated litigation with the IRS.”).
51. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The majority purports to follow this [because of litigation]
test, but never even cites it. Rather, in its place, the majority imposes a ‘prepared for’ test, asking if the
documents were ‘prepared for use in possible litigation.’”).
54. Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that this newly created for use test is even narrower than the
primary motivating purpose test which was previously rejected by the First Circuit).
55. Id. at 30 (“There is no evidence in this case that the work papers . . . would in fact serve any
useful purpose for Textron in conducting litigation . . . .”).
56. Id. at 29. The court continued, “[T]he work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done
for litigation, not in preparing financial statements.” Id. at 31.
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anticipation of litigation requirement for work product protection.57
In Regions Financial Corporation v. United States, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Alabama stated that if it
had to determine which test the Eleventh Circuit would adopt, it
would select the because of litigation test.58 The district court’s ruling
in Regions rested heavily on the District of Rhode Island’s decision
in Textron, the same reasoning rejected by the First Circuit in its
review of the lower court’s Textron decision.59
The Supreme Court has not imposed a test for determining whether
material is created in anticipation of litigation, though the dissent in
Textron noted: “The time is ripe for the Supreme Court to intervene
and set the circuits straight on this issue which is essential to the daily
practice of litigators across the country.”60 Until the Supreme Court
addresses this issue, circuit courts are left to determine the
appropriate method for analyzing potentially protected material. A
thorough analysis of the case history of the Eleventh Circuit is the
first step in determining the appropriate test the courts in the Eleventh
Circuit should apply. Additionally, analysis of the text and
underlying policy of Rule 26(b)(3), along with analysis of the three
existing tests, should guide the Eleventh Circuit in its determination
of the proper method to evaluate material for potential work product
protection.

57. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, *5 (N.D.
Ala. May 8, 2008) (“[T]he parties have called upon the court to decide how the Eleventh Circuit would
resolve this issue. If it were forced to decide the question, the court concludes that the Eleventh Circuit
would align itself with the majority of the other courts of appeal and adopt the ‘because of litigation’
test. However, it is not necessary to determine which test applies here because the result in this case is
the same regardless of which test the court applies.”).
58. Id. The Regions court first determined that the Eleventh Circuit had not explicitly adopted a test
for determining whether material was prepared in anticipation of litigation before going on to conclude
which test it thought the Eleventh Circuit would adopt.
59. Id. at *6 (relying heavily on the district court’s “but for” analysis, stating that “there would have
been no need to create a reserve in the first place, if Textron had not anticipated a dispute with the IRS
that was likely to result in litigation or some other adversarial proceeding” (quoting United States v.
Textron, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 150 (D.R.I. 2007))); Textron, 577 F.3d at 26 (holding that the work
papers at issue were not prepared in anticipation of litigation).
60. Textron, 577 F.3d at 43 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
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II. CIRCUIT SPLIT ANALYSIS
A. The Eleventh Circuit Has Not Adopted a Test for Analyzing in
Anticipation of Litigation
The first step in determining the test the Eleventh Circuit should
apply to the question of whether material was prepared in anticipation
of litigation, for purposes of Rule 26(b)(3), is an analysis of the
previous Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Court decisions.61 The Eleventh
Circuit is bound by the decisions of the Fifth Circuit handed down
before October 1, 1981.62 This specific question—whether the Fifth
Circuit had formally adopted a test for analyzing work product under
the in anticipation of litigation requirement prior to the creation of the
Eleventh Circuit—was addressed directly by the District Court of
Northern Alabama in Regions Financial v. United States.63 The court
performed a thorough analysis of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit
decisions and concluded that no binding test had been previously
adopted.64 Further, the court did not apply one of the two existing
tests—the because of or primary motivating purpose tests—in
61. This Note addresses what test the Eleventh Circuit should adopt, so if a review of the previous
decisions of the Eleventh Circuit shows that a test has previously been adopted, the analysis ends.
Additionally, if a test had been adopted by the Fifth Circuit prior to the creation of the Eleventh Circuit,
it would be binding unless the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, overturns the previous decision. See
infra note 62.
62. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *4 n.6 (citing Bonner and noting that a review of Fifth Circuit
decisions was required to determine if a binding test had been adopted); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down before
the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit). This does not mean
that if a test were adopted by the Fifth Circuit it could not be overturned, but it would require the
Eleventh Circuit en banc court to overturn prior precedent of the Fifth Circuit handed down before the
creation of the Eleventh Circuit. Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc. 204 F.3d 1069, 1076 (11th Cir. 2000).
63. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3–5. Although the court’s discussion is dictum because the
court determined it did not need to apply a test in this case, the court performed a thorough analysis of
three previous Eleventh and Fifth Circuit decisions and concluded that no binding test had been adopted.
Id.
64. Id. Here, the court analyzed three previous decisions: In re Newton, 718 F.2d 1015, 1016 (11th
Cir. 1983), Hoover v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1980), and United States v.
Davis, 636 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1981). The court held that Newton was not binding because it did not
address the attorney work product privilege; rather, Newton dealt with an accountant work product
privilege, similar to that addressed in United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984). Regions,
2008 WL 2139008, at *3–5. The court held that Hoover was not binding because the court did not
articulate a test. Id. at *4. Finally, the court held that Davis was not binding because the Davis court’s
discussion of a possible test was dictum. Id. at *5; see also discussion infra Part.II.B.2.
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Regions because it determined that under the facts of the case the
material in question would be protected under either currently
existing test.65 No cases addressing this issue have been presented in
the Eleventh Circuit since Regions, so the Eleventh Circuit is free to
formally adopt the most appropriate test for analyzing material under
the in anticipation of litigation requirement of Rule 26(b)(3).66
B. Possible Tests the Eleventh Circuit Could Adopt
1. The Because of Litigation Test
The primary goal of the because of litigation test is protection of
material that contains the mental impressions, conclusions, and
opinions of the attorney, and it allows protection of material that may
have a business purpose but nonetheless was created because of
anticipated litigation.67 The because of litigation test does not conflict
with the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3), which protects documents
prepared in anticipation of litigation.68 Further, the because of
litigation test does not conflict with the underlying policy of the work
product doctrine, which is to protect the attorney’s assessment of the
issue in light of potential litigation.69
Rule 26(b)(3) reads: “Ordinarily, a party may not discover . . .
things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”70 The
65. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *5–6. The court found that the work papers at issue were created
because of litigation—there would have been no need for a tax reserve if Regions did not anticipate
litigation with the IRS. Id. Further, the court found that Regions was primarily motivated by litigation
because the company was soliciting legal opinions on the outcome of litigation, which meets the primary
motivating purpose test. Id.
66. Regions Financial was decided on May 8, 2008, and a Westlaw search revealed that no further
decisions requiring the Eleventh Circuit to answer the question of whether dual-purpose material was
prepared in anticipation of litigation have been reported.
67. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998). This test stems from the Wright &
Miller treatise which articulates the appropriate test as “whether, in light of the nature of the document
and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation.” 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (2009). The treatise emphasizes that “‘[d]ual purpose’
documents created because of the prospect of litigation are protected even though they were also
prepared for a business purpose.” Id.
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3); see infra note 148.
69. See discussion infra Part III.B.
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
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text of the Rule states that material other than only that prepared “for
trial” is protected.71 Specifically, material prepared in anticipation of
litigation is also protected.72 The because of litigation test applies this
language literally, providing protection to documents created because
of anticipated litigation and not limiting protection to documents
created only for litigation.73 Additionally, the because of litigation
test protects the mental impression and opinions of the attorney,
complying with the underlying policy of work product protection as
stated by the Supreme Court.74 Finally, the because of litigation test
allows protection of dual-purpose documents, which is not at odds
with the intent of the drafters of the Rule.75
Because this test is firmly grounded in both the plain language and
underlying policy of the work product doctrine, it has been embraced
by many courts, making it the most widely adopted test applied in
analyzing material under the in anticipation of litigation requirement
for work product protection.76
2. The Primary Motivating Purpose Test
The primary motivating purpose test has been expressly adopted
by only one circuit.77 This test protects material only when the
primary purpose of the material is to assist in litigation.78 In United
States v. El Paso, the court applied the test articulated in United
States v. Davis and held that the dual-purpose work papers at issue
were not protected because the primary purpose of the work papers

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Where a document was
created because of anticipated litigation . . . it falls within Rule 26(b)(3).”).
74. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975) (reiterating the strong public policy
considerations outlined in Hickman v. Taylor.); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947).
75. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
76. See cases cited supra note 39.
77. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Henkel, supra note 7, at
253 n.22 (noting that only the Fifth Circuit applies the primary motivating purpose test).
78. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542–43. This test was based on an earlier decision of the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. Davis. 636 F.2d 1028. The Davis court stated: “We conclude that litigation need not
necessarily be imminent . . . as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the
document was to aid in possible future litigation.” Id. at 1040 (emphasis added).
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was to obtain a clean audit opinion.79 However, in relying on Davis,
the El Paso court overlooks a key difference in the facts of the two
cases.80 Davis dealt with tax return work papers,81 but El Paso dealt
with tax accrual work papers.82
Tax return work papers are prepared simply to support amounts
reported on the tax return.83 They are prepared in the ordinary course
of business and are prepared regardless of whether there is a
possibility of litigation.84 They do not support tax reserves, and they
do not contain material that has historically been protected as the
opinion or mental impressions of attorneys—they are accounting
records that support the numbers on the tax return.85 Thus, the court
in Davis correctly found that these tax return work papers were not
prepared in anticipation of litigation because the only purpose for
preparing them was a business purpose—to support a business tax
filing required by law.86 There was no need for the Davis court to
apply a test because there was no question that these work papers
were not prepared “in anticipation of [any] litigation.”87
Tax accrual work papers are not prepared to support tax return
filings; they are prepared to calculate (and properly reserve) the
possible outcome of litigation with the IRS.88 It is this possibility of
79. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 543–44.
80. Compare Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032 (addressing tax return work papers), with El Paso, 682 F.2d at
533 (addressing tax accrual work papers).
81. Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032 (The material at issue consisted of “workpapers . . . generated in the
course of preparing . . . tax returns.”).
82. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 533 (Here, the court was “concerned with documents known to the
accounting profession [as] tax accrual work papers.”).
83. Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032.
84. United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 146 (D.R.I. 2007) (“[T]he mere preparation
of a tax return is viewed as accounting work and a taxpayer may not cloak the documents generated in
that process with a privilege simply ‘by hiring a lawyer to do the work that an accountant . . . normally
would do.’” (quoting United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1999))).
85. See Davis, 636 F.2d at 1032.
86. Id. at 1039–40 (“[I]t is plain here that none of the summoned documents were ‘materials
prepared by an attorney “acting for his client in anticipation of litigation.”’” (quoting United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237–38 (1975))).
87. Prior to the conclusion of the Davis court that a primary motivating purpose should be the test,
the court clearly stated that it was “plain” in this case that the documents were not prepared in
anticipation of litigation—making it unnecessary (and thus dictum) to articulate a test to determine
whether the material was created in anticipation of litigation. Davis, 636 F.2d at 1039–40.
88. FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 5–8 (outlining two step process for identifying
and measuring uncertain tax positions).
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litigation aspect of the tax accrual work paper that requires the
application of a test to determine if the material is protected work
product.89 The Fifth Circuit, in El Paso, was free to create a test
requiring a primary motivating purpose requirement, but it did not
perform any analysis of the merits of the appropriate test; instead, it
relied on the Davis language as precedent.90 Because Davis dealt with
tax return work papers, the court did not need to apply a test to
determine if the material at issue was prepared in anticipation of
litigation, and the court in El Paso should have treated the language
in Davis as dictum.91 The court in Regions Financial recognized this
fact in determining that the language in Davis did not create binding
precedent for the Eleventh Circuit.92
As applied by the Fifth Circuit, the primary motivating purpose
test ignores the actual language of Rule 26(b)(3) and fails to consider
the underlying policy behind the protection of work product.93
Because of this, several courts have criticized the Fifth Circuit’s
primary motivating purpose test as inconsistent with the language and
goals of the work product privilege.94
89. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, *4 (N.D.
Ala. May 8, 2008) (noting the difference between ordinary tax return work papers and work papers that
analyze tax positions).
90. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (“In United States v. Davis we
phrased the test in the following terms: ‘Litigation need not be imminent . . . as long as the primary
motivating purpose . . . was to aid in possible future litigation.’” (quoting United States v. Davis, 636
F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981))).
91. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (The court discusses Davis and
finds that because there was no evidence of anticipated litigation in Davis, the court’s language could be
characterized as dictum.).
92. See discussion supra Part II.A discussing the impact of Fifth Circuit decisions on the Eleventh
Circuit. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *4 (“[T]he Second Circuit has opined that because ‘there was no
showing whatsoever of anticipation of litigation,’ the Davis language ‘might be characterized as
dictum’. . . . Even without viewing Davis language as dicta, the factual differences between Davis and
the present case make Davis wholly distinguishable.”).
93. See infra note 94.
94. Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting the because of test
and noting the rejection of the primary motivating purpose test by the Adlman court); Adlman, 134 F.3d
at 1198 (holding that a requirement of primary purpose is at odds with the Rule); Evergreen Trading,
LLC ex rel. Nussdorf v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 122, 132 (2007) (holding that the because of test is
preferable to the primary motivating purpose test). In Evergreen Trading, the court rationalized that the
primary motivating purpose test “could unreasonably deny the protection to ‘dual-purpose’ documents
generated in making the decision whether to enter into a transaction based upon tax litigation concerns,
even though such documents could reveal an attorney’s litigating strategies and assessment of legal
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The Second Circuit, in United States v. Adlman, stated that a
requirement of primary purpose is at odds with the language of Rule
26(b)(3), which on its face allows protection of documents prepared
both for trial and in anticipation of litigation.95 The court noted that
nowhere in Rule 26(b)(3) is there a requirement that a document be
created primarily to aid in litigation, and if the drafters had intended
such a requirement, they would have simply used “prepared . . . for
trial” and not added language that documents prepared in anticipation
of litigation were protected work product.96 The U.S. Court of
Federal Claims, in Evergreen Trading v. United States, likewise held
that the primary motivating purpose test did not comport to the plain
language of the Rule.97
Applying the primary motivating purpose test in the way the Fifth
Circuit has applied it ignores the underlying policy of work product
protection. The Second Circuit stated it very well in Adlman:
Where the Rule has explicitly established a special level of
protection against disclosure for documents revealing an
attorney’s . . . opinion and legal theories concerning litigation, it
would oddly undermine its purposes if such documents were
excluded from protection merely because they were prepared to
assist in the making of a business decision expected to result in
the litigation.98

The Supreme Court has held that there is a strong public policy
underlying the work product privilege, emphasizing the importance
vulnerabilities—precisely the type of discovery that the Supreme Court refused to permit in Hickman.”
Id.
95. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1198 (“We believe that a requirement that documents be produced primarily
or exclusively to assist in litigation in order to be protected is at odds with the text and the policies of the
Rule. . . . Preparing a document ‘in anticipation of litigation’ is sufficient.”).
96. Id. (“If the drafters . . . intended to limit its protection to documents made to assist in preparation
for litigation, this would have been adequately conveyed by the phrase ‘prepared . . . for trial.’”).
97. See Evergreen Trading, 80 Fed. Cl. at 132–33. In determining which test was appropriate to
apply, the court analyzed both the because of and the primary motivating purpose tests. Id. The court
stated that the because of test “more closely tracks the language of the rule, which says nothing of
whether a document is produced ‘primarily’ for litigation, but rather is triggered so long as anticipating
litigation was one of the purposes for which the document was prepared.” Id.
98. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199.
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of protecting documents that tend to reveal the attorney’s “mental
[process].”99 In Adlman, the court illustrated the problems that would
arise by applying the primary motivating purpose test.100 For
example, a memorandum prepared in expectation of litigation that
analyzed the legal outcomes of a proposed business transaction
would be discoverable simply because the memorandum’s primary
purpose was to assist the company in deciding whether to undertake
the transaction.101 The result is discovery of critical opinions and
impressions of the attorney preparing the memorandum in
anticipation of litigation—the very essence of what the work product
privilege is designed to protect.102
However, even if the primary motivating purpose test is adopted,
when this test is applied correctly, tax accrual work papers analyzing
the various outcomes of possible litigation with the IRS are protected.
In Regions Financial v. United States, the court held that the tax
accrual work papers at issue would be protected under either of the
two tests available: the because of or the primary motivating purpose
test.103 The court went on to say that although there was a business
purpose, the work papers “would not have been created were Regions
not primarily concerned with litigating with the IRS concerning the
Transaction.”104 The Regions court was careful to isolate and identify
the motivation behind the creation of the work papers, and the court
did not confuse the purpose of the work papers with their resulting
benefit.105 The purpose of the entire process of creating tax accrual
work papers is to set aside sufficient funds in the event liability arises
99. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236 (1975) (reiterating the strong public policy
considerations outlined in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)).
100. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199–1200 (giving several examples of the problems that result from
applying the primary motivating purpose test).
101. Id. at 1199.
102. Id. (“Framing the inquiry as whether the primary . . . purpose . . . was to assist in litigation
threatens to deny protection to documents that implicate key concerns underlying the work-product
doctrine.”).
103. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, *7 (N.D.
Ala. May 8, 2008) (“[T]he court finds that Regions has . . . show[n] that the contested documents were
created in anticipation of litigation regardless of whether this court applies the ‘because of litigation’ or
‘primary motivating purpose’ test.”).
104. Regions, 2008 WL 2139008, at *7.
105. See id. at *6.
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from its tax positions.106 The company is attempting to forecast (and
reserve) the most likely impact of potential litigation with the IRS.107
The benefit derived from that purpose is that the company is not
misleading its investors (i.e., the company is properly reserved and
can obtain a clean audit opinion of its financial statements).108 If the
formulation of the test as articulated by the Regions court was applied
in El Paso, the work papers would have been protected. In El Paso,
the court found that the primary purpose of the tax accrual work
papers at issue was to adequately reserve the impact of possible
litigation with the IRS.109 The El Paso court seems to confuse the
resulting benefit of the work papers with the purpose for creating the
work papers.110 The immediate purpose was to adequately reserve the
impact of litigation on the company’s financial statements, but the
primary purpose was to calculate the potential scenarios of litigation
with the IRS—El Paso would not have prepared the work papers had
they not anticipated a dispute with the IRS.
3. The For Use Test
The for use test, recently created by the First Circuit in Textron v.
United States, protects material only if prepared for use in
litigation.111 This court’s view is that the work product privilege is
aimed at protecting work done for litigation and not for preparing
financial statements.112 The court stated: “‘[P]repared in anticipation
106. WEST’S TAX LAW DICTIONARY 1052 (2009) (defining tax accrual work papers as “[w]ork papers
and related documents prepared by accountants in evaluating a taxpayer’s contingent liability”
(emphasis added)). The purpose of tax reserves is to anticipate and establish a liability on the financial
statements before disagreement with the IRS. See FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶ 17.
The tax positions reserved are called uncertain tax positions precisely because the company does not yet
know if they will win or lose on the tax position until the IRS audits the tax return. See Id. at ¶¶ 6, 17.
107. See FASB Interpretation No. 48, supra note 15, at ¶ 17.
108. See id. The purpose of FASB Interpretation No. 48 is to identify and measure uncertain tax
positions that are anticipated to be contested by the IRS. See id. at ¶¶ 6–8. By identifying and measuring
its tax uncertainties, the company will properly reserve the potential liability on its financial statements,
and the readers of the financial statements will not be misled. See id. at ¶ 17.
109. United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982).
110. See supra note 108.
111. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009).
112. Id. (“[T]he work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done for litigation, not in
preparing financial statements.”).
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of litigation or for trial’ did not . . . mean prepared for some purpose
other than litigation: it meant only that the work might be done for
litigation but in advance of its institution.”113 To support its
proposition, the court cited the advisory committee notes to Rule
26(b)(3), which state that material created simply for normal or
routine business purposes is not protected.114
The Textron court seems to interpret the advisory committee notes
to mean that any business purpose defeats the work product
protection.115 Based on this interpretation, the court analyzes the
work papers, finds an ordinary business purpose, and determines that
work product protection is not available.116 However, this is not what
the advisory committee notes say. Instead, they state that material is
not protected if it is prepared for a business or public requirement
purpose unrelated to litigation and imply that material having both a
business and litigation purpose can be protected, and only material
that is created regardless of potential litigation would be denied
protection.117
III. PROPOSAL
A. The Court Should First Analyze its Prior Precedent
The Eleventh Circuit has not formally adopted a test for analyzing
material under the work product privilege.118 The District Court of
Northern Alabama, in Regions Financial v. United States,119
113. Id. at 29.
114. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501(“Materials assembled in the ordinary course of
business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes
are not under the qualified immunity . . . .”).
115. Textron, 577 F.3d at 30 (stating that “[e]ven if prepared by lawyers and reflecting legal
thinking,” the work papers are not protected if created in the ordinary course of business). Further, the
court dismissed the fact that the work papers had any relation to possible litigation with the IRS and
simply stated that “[n]o one with experience of law suits would talk about tax accrual work papers in
those terms.” Id.
116. See id. at 29–30.
117. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501.
118. See discussion supra Part II.A.
119. Regions Fin. Corp. v. United States, No. 2:06-CV-00895-RDP, 2008 WL 2139008, at *3–5
(N.D. Ala. May 8, 2008) (analyzing previous Eleventh and Fifth Circuit decisions and concluding that
no binding test had been adopted).
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performed a thorough analysis of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit
decisions and concluded that a binding test had not been adopted.120
The Regions court did not apply one of the two existing tests—the
because of or primary motivating purpose test—because it
determined that under the facts of the case the material in question
would be protected under either test.121 Since no cases addressing this
issue have been presented in the Eleventh Circuit after Regions, the
circuit court should analyze the existing tests and adopt the test that
most closely aligns with both the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3) and
the policy of the work product privilege.122
B. The Court Should Analyze the Plain Language and Policy of Rule
26(b)(3)
Rule 26(b)(3) states, “[A] party may not discover documents and
tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party.”123 The inclusion of the phrase in
anticipation of litigation clearly indicates that material other than that
created for trial is protected.124 However, the plain language of the
Rule does not define the meaning of in anticipation of litigation.125
For this, the court should look to the policy underlying the work
product privilege for guidance.126
The Supreme Court articulated the policy of work product
protection in Hickman v. Taylor: “[I]t is essential that a lawyer work
with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
120. Id.; supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
121. Supra note 64.
122. Supra note 65.
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
124. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998) (“If the drafters of the Rule
intended to limit its protection to documents made to assist in preparation for litigation, this would have
been adequately conveyed by the phrase ‘prepared . . . for trial.’”).
125. Id. at 1197 (finding that in anticipation of litigation had not been defined and noting the various
meanings given the phrase by other courts and commentators).
126. Several courts have looked to the policy and intent of the privilege to define in anticipation of
litigation. See id. at 1197–1203 (analyzing the plain language, policy and advisory committee’s notes in
determining that the because of litigation test is most closely aligned with the text and policy of the
privilege). But see United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982) (looking to the language
and advisory committee’s notes but determining that the primary motivating purpose test is the more
appropriate test).
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opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation . . . demands
that he . . . prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
undue and needless interference.”127 The Court has reaffirmed this
policy and stated, “At its core, the work-product doctrine shelters the
mental processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within
which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case.”128
As the Second Circuit noted in United States v. Adlman, the
policies articulated by the Supreme Court and the intent of the
drafters of the Rule suggest that a business purpose alone should not
bar the protection of the material that reveals the opinions and legal
theories concerning litigation.129 This interpretation would not deny
protection of dual-purpose documents merely because they have a
business purpose; rather, the focus would be on why the documents
were created and whether they contain protected material.130 The
Eleventh Circuit should keep these important policy considerations in
mind when analyzing the appropriate test to adopt.
C. The Court Should Analyze the Tests Adopted by Other Courts
In attempting to define in anticipation of litigation, circuit courts
have adopted one of three main tests131—the majority of circuits have
adopted the because of litigation test;132 the Fifth Circuit has adopted

127. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947).
128. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–38 (1975).
129. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1199 (“[T]he policies underlying the work-product doctrine suggest
strongly that work-product protection should not be denied to a document that analyzes expected
litigation merely because it is prepared to assist in a business decision.”). The intent of the Rule’s
drafters is helpful in defining in anticipation of litigation. The advisory committee’s note states that
“each side’s informal evaluation of its case should be protected, that each side should be encouraged to
prepare independently, and that one side should not automatically have the benefit of the detailed
preparatory work of the other side.” 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501.
130. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1200 (“We see no basis for adopting a test under which an attorney’s
assessment of the likely outcome of litigation is freely available . . . merely because the document was
created for a business purpose . . . . The fact that a document’s purpose is business-related appears
irrelevant to the question whether it should be protected under Rule 26(b)(3).”).
131. See id. at 1195 (because of litigation test); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th
Cir. 1982) (primary motivating purpose test); United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir.
2009) (new for use in litigation test). For a discussion of each of the three tests, see discussion supra
Part I.B.
132. For other courts adopting the because of test, see supra note 39.
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the primary motivating purpose test;133 and the First Circuit has
recently created the for use test.134
1. The Because of Litigation Test is Well Reasoned
The because of litigation test is a well-reasoned test that considers
both the actual language of the Rule and the underlying purpose of
the work product privilege.135 The because of test protects material
created because of anticipated litigation and allows protection of
material whether or not it may have a business purpose.136 Material is
denied protection only if it would have been prepared in substantially
similar form regardless of the anticipated litigation.137 The primary
goal of the because of test is protection of material that contains the
mental impressions, conclusions, and opinions of the attorney, and it
allows protection of material that may have a business purpose but
nonetheless was created because of anticipated litigation.138
The because of litigation test does not conflict with the plain
language of Rule 26(b)(3), which protects documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation, nor does it conflict with the underlying
policy of the work product doctrine which is to protect the attorney’s
assessment of the issue in light of potential litigation.139 For these
reasons, the because of litigation test has been widely adopted and is
the most prevalent test utilized by circuit courts to analyze material
under the in anticipation of litigation requirement for work product
protection.140

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (primary motivating purpose test).
Textron, 577 F.3d at 31 (new for use in litigation test).
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
Id.
United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1; see also supra note 76.
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2. The Primary Motivating Purpose Test Denies Protection to
Dual-Purpose Documents
The primary motivating purpose test has been expressly adopted
by only one circuit.141 This test protects material only when the
primary purpose of the material is to assist in possible future
litigation.142 Application of the primary motivating purpose test has
resulted in the denial of protection because the primary purpose of
the material was business related (i.e., to obtain a clean audit opinion
of the financial statements), despite the fact that the work papers
contained important mental impressions and legal opinions related to
anticipated litigation.143
The primary motivating purpose test places too much emphasis on
the potential business purpose—at the expense of the protection of
important legal opinions related to litigation that may be contained in
the material.144 This emphasis is inconsistent with the primary goal of
work product protection—to protect the attorney’s mental
impressions and opinions regarding anticipated litigation.145 The
Supreme Court, since Hickman v. Taylor, has stressed the policy goal
of the privilege as the protection of the mental impressions and
opinions of the attorney.146
Additionally, the primary motivating purpose test places too much
emphasis on a comment of the drafters that ordinary business
documents are not protected.147 The advisory committee notes state
that ordinary business documents are not protected, but this comment
must be read in conjunction with the actual language of the Rule.148
141. United States v. El Paso, 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Henkel, supra note 7, at
n.22.
142. El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542.
143. See id. at 543–44.
144. The El Paso court determined that because the work papers at issue were created primarily to
substantiate the company’s tax reserve on its financial statements, the material was not protected. Id. at
543.
145. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947).
146. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236–38 (1975).
147. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501 (“Materials assembled in the ordinary course of
business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes
are not under the qualified immunity . . . .”).
148. The text of the Rule states that material other than only that prepared for trial are protected. FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Specifically, material prepared in anticipation of litigation is also protected. Id. The

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss3/7

24

Hamilton: Work Product Privilege: The Future of Tax Accrual Work Paper Disc

2011]

WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGE

753

When read together, the advisory committee notes imply protection
of dual-purpose documents and only emphasize that ordinary
business documents, which would be created even if litigation was
not anticipated, would be denied protection.149 The committee notes
stress the importance of protecting the opinions and impressions of
the attorneys preparing for anticipated litigation.150 Unlike the
primary motivating purpose test, the because of litigation test
addresses these concerns by requiring the court to ask whether the
material would have been prepared even if there had been no
anticipation of litigation—allowing protection of dual-purpose
documents but denying protection to ordinary business records that
would have been prepared whether there was anticipated litigation or
not.151
3. The For Use Test Denies Protection to Documents Not Created
for Trial
The for use test, recently created by the First Circuit in Textron v.
United States, protects material only if prepared for use in
litigation.152 This court’s view is that the work product privilege is
aimed at protecting work done for litigation and not for preparing
financial statements.153 The court states: “‘[P]repared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial’ did not . . . mean prepared for some purpose
other than litigation: it meant only that the work might be done for
litigation but in advance of its institution.”154 Application of the for
use test has resulted in the denial of protection to dual-purpose
advisory committee’s notes state, “Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to
public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified
immunity . . . .” The advisory committee notes imply that ordinary business records prepared where
there is no anticipation of litigation are not in anticipation of litigation, but the notes do not imply that
material created with anticipated litigation in mind that have a business purpose would not be
protected—that would directly contradict the plain language of the in anticipation of litigation clause in
the Rule. 1970 Amendments, supra note 43, at 501.
149. Id.
150. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
151. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1195 (2d Cir. 1998).
152. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009).
153. Id. (holding that work product privilege does not protect material created in preparation of
financial statements).
154. Id. at 29.
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documents because the material was prepared for a business purpose,
despite the fact that the material contained important mental
impressions and legal opinions related to anticipated litigation.155
Much like the primary motivating purpose test, the for use test also
places too much emphasis on the potential business purpose—and the
advisory committee notes—at the expense of the protection of
important legal opinions related to litigation.156 The for use test is
inconsistent with the plain language of the Rule and the primary goal
of work product protection.157 The for use test goes one step further
than the primary motivating purpose test, and it rewrites the Rule to
require preparation for use in anticipated litigation or for use at
trial.158 Rule 26(b)(3) states that material prepared in anticipation of
litigation—not “for use in anticipation of litigation”—is protected.159
Additionally, the First Circuit’s reliance on the advisory committee
notes is misplaced.160
In contrast, the because of test addresses these concerns by
requiring the court to ask whether the material would have been
prepared even if there had been no anticipation of litigation—
allowing protection of dual-purpose documents but denying
protection to ordinary business records that would have been
prepared whether or not litigation was anticipated.161
D. The Eleventh Circuit Should Formally Adopt the Because of
Litigation Test
The primary motivating purpose test is too narrow because it
denies protection to most dual-purpose documents at the expense of
the protection of important legal opinion related to anticipated

155. Id. at 29–30.
156. See supra note 144.
157. See supra note 148.
158. See supra note 148. As noted by the court in United States v. Adlman, “Nowhere does Rule
26(b)(3) state that a document must have been prepared to aid in the conduct of litigation in order to
constitute work product.” United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998).
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
160. See supra note 148.
161. Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1195.
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litigation—a key principle of the work product doctrine.162 The for
use in anticipated litigation test is too narrow because it denies
protection to documents not created to be used in anticipated
litigation, which is at odds with the actual language of Rule
26(b)(3).163 The Eleventh Circuit should join the majority of courts
that have addressed the issue of dual-purposed documents and adopt
the because of litigation test. This test considers both the actual
language of the Rule and the underlying purpose of the work product
privilege, eliminating the concerns and issues raised by the primary
motivating purpose and the for use tests.164
CONCLUSION
The struggle between the IRS and business taxpayers regarding the
discovery of tax accrual work papers will continue until the Supreme
Court addresses the issue and imposes a test.165 Until then, the IRS
will continue to seek a road map of the corporation’s vulnerable tax
positions, and corporate taxpayers will continue to fight, desperate to
keep the IRS from discovering the legal analysis of their weak
spots.166 In balancing these competing interests, the Eleventh Circuit
should seek to adopt a test that is consistent with the plain language
of the Rule and the spirit of the work product privilege outlined by
the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor.167 The because of litigation
test accomplishes both of these goals—allowing the IRS access to
work papers created where the taxpayer has no reasonable basis for
anticipating litigation and protecting the attorney’s legal opinions in
162. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
163. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
164. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
165. See United States v. Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805, 807 (1984) (IRS challenge of judgment
holding tax work papers privileged); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1982)
(appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s tax accrual work papers); Adlman, 134 F.3d
at 1194; I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63 (July 8, 2002) (IRS expands internal policy on seeking tax
accrual work papers).
166. See Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 807 (IRS challenge of judgment holding tax work papers
privileged); El Paso, 682 F.2d at 532 (appeal of enforcement of IRS summons seeking taxpayer’s tax
accrual work papers); Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1194; I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63 (IRS expands internal
policy on seeking tax accrual work papers).
167. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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cases where litigation is reasonably anticipated. Adopting the because
of test eliminates the need to determine whether a business purpose
for the material exists, because anticipation of litigation—not the
absence of a business purpose—is the real key to protection of
material under Rule 26(b)(3).
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